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body. Such a view makes a relation logically prior to the terms which it 
relates: the terms of the relation derive their being from standing in the 
relation. This view gets things backwards. It is intuitively plausible to view 
a relation as dependent for its obtaining on its ontologically independent 
terms. Hence, for a soul to exist in relation to its body, each one's existence 
must be independent of the relation in which it stands to the other. 
Braine will respond that viewing the human being as a substantial soul in 
relation to a substantial body destroys the unity of the human being. To 
preserve this unity, there must be no question of a substantial soul being 
incarnated or re-incarnated with a separately originating body. In defending 
this view, however, he is simply at odds with what the ordinary human being 
can conceive. For the very reasons he so ably sets forth (e.g., the simplicity 
of the T, the phenomenology of perception), the ordinary person is able to 
conceive of incarnation and re-incarnation. And this indicates that the ordi-
nary person does not think of himself as unified with his body in the way 
that Braine asserts. This is important, because in reading a book such as 
Braine's, one often comes away with the impression that dualism is the 
invention of a philosopher such as Descartes. But it isn't. Descartes phi-
losophized about dualism; he did not invent it. Where Descartes' view con-
flicts with the ordinary person's view of the human being is not with regard 
to the soul's existence but with respect to its spatiality. When the ordinary 
person thinks of the soul, he thinks of it as an ethereal or ghostly entity with 
a shape like that of a human body. This lends support to Braine's position 
that the ordinary person thinks of himself as a bodily being. Descartes argued 
that the soul cannot be in space because anything which is in space is ex-
tended and, thereby, divisible into parts. Perhaps, what is needed is a serious 
reconsideration of whether or not a substantial soul could both be a bodily 
being in space and indivisible. This would involve the soul being a body in 
a different sense than its being a physical body, but perhaps such a concept 
should not be too readily dismissed. 
In conclusion, while Braine's holistic view of the human being is not 
without its problems, there is much in The Human Person from which one 
can learn. It is a book well worth reading. 
Hell: The Logic of Damnation, by Jerry L. Walls. Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1992. Pp. 182. $26.95 (cloth). 
THOMAS TALBOTT, Willamette University. 
As he expresses it himself, Jerry Walls' purpose in writing his book "is to 
shJW that some recognizably traditional views of hell are compatible with 
both the divine nature and human nature" (p. 14). He defends a two-fold 
thesis: first that, for all we know, God had good reasons to create persons 
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with libertarian free will, and second that, for all we know, some of these 
persons will freely make a decisive decision for evil and thus against God. 
The book is honest, clearly written, and in general free from partisan polem-
ics. It might serve very well as a text for an undergraduate or seminary course 
dealing with the topic of hell. 
Walls divides his book into an introduction, six chapters, and a conclusion. 
In his introduction, he distinguishes between several possible views, ranging 
from the traditional popular view, as he calls it, to the convinced universalist 
view; he also suggests that "hell [in the sense of everlasting separation from 
God] cannot be easily extricated from other theistic beliefs" (p. 7) or from a 
fully Christian understanding of salvation (pp. 6-7). He then launches into 
a wide-ranging discussion. In "Hell and Human Belief," he asks whether the 
origin of the belief in hell "has any bearing on whether or not the doctrine is 
true" (p. 17); and he concludes that the historical origin of this belief could, 
but in fact does not, have such a bearing. Three chapters follow in which he 
discusses hell in relation to some of the divine attributes: In "Hell and Divine 
Knowledge," he tries to illustrate the point that "one's views on hell cannot 
be isolated from one's views on foreknowledge" (p. 55); in "Hell and Divine 
Power," he criticizes both Calvinism and universalism, arguing that they 
"share an important similarity in that both assume God can save anyone he 
will" (p. 80); and in "Hell and Divine Goodness," he argues that "hell is 
compatible with God's perfect goodness," provided that God "is willing to 
do whatever he can, short of overriding freedom, to give happiness to all" 
(pp. 110-111). The centerpiece of his defense, however, is a chapter entitled 
"Hell and Human Freedom," where he argues for the possibility of "a decisive 
choice of evil" (p. 117ff) and criticizes my own view that the very idea of 
such a choice is deeply incoherent. That is followed by a final chapter, "Hell 
and Human Misery," in which he explores the nature of the suffering in hell. 
He then concludes his discussion with this observation: When properly under-
stood, the doctrine of hell "has positive moral value," he says, because it "un-
derwrites in a way which perhaps nothing else can the claim that we are 
accountable for our actions and cannot escape responsibility for them" (p. 157). 
Now as I have said, Walls' main purpose is to articulate and defend a 
"recognizably traditional" conception of hell. But I doubt that his own con-
ception would fit such a description. For according to the tradition, hell has 
two crucial features: (a) It is a place of terrifying punishment for sin, and 
(b) the punishment will literally last forever. So if one believes, as I do, that 
the idea of everlasting punishment is riddled with confusion and incoher-
ence, lone must, at the very least, revise the tradition in one of two ways: 
One might deny that hell is literally a place of punishment, or, if one continues 
to think of it as a place of punishment, one might deny that the punishment 
will literally last forever. Whereas many universalists opt for the second 
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alternative, Walls apparently opts for the first. For he insists, in the first 
place, that "the misery of hell is not so much a penalty imposed by God to 
make the sinner pay for his sin, as it is the necessary outcome of living a 
sinful life" (p. 150); and he insists, secondly, that those in hell will choose 
to remain there of their own free will. Indeed, omnipotent love can do 
nothing, short of removing their freedom, to change their minds. But why, 
one might ask, would anyone freely choose to remain in hell forever? Be-
cause, Walls in effect replies, from the perspective of the damned hell is really 
not that bad a place to be; as Walls sees it, "hell may afford its inhabitants a 
kind of gratification which motivates the choice to go there" (p. 128). More 
than that, the damned will even have a kind of illusory happiness. 
Those in hell may be almost happy, and this may explain why they insist on 
staying there. They do not, of course, experience even a shred of genuine 
happiness. But perhaps they experience a certain perverse sense of satisfac-
tion, a distorted sort of pleasure (p. 126). 
Though Walls here denies that the damned are genuinely happy, he does not 
deny that they believe themselves to be happy; to the contrary, he insists that, 
for some lost souls, the illusion of happiness may endure forever and with 
sufficient conviction to explain why they never leave their preferred abode 
in hell. 
Those who prefer hell to heaven have convinced themselves that it is better. 
In their desire to justify their choice of evil, they have persuaded themselves 
that whatever satisfaction they experience from evil is superior to the joy 
which God offers (p. 129). 
This line of thought leads naturally, I would suggest, to the following 
conclusion: Because God knows that he can do nothing, short of removing 
their freedom, to induce the damned to repent, he simply employs his om-
n.ipotent power to make them as comfortable as possible and to prevent them 
from harming others. Walls does not, it is true, explicitly embrace this idea, 
and he may even distance himself from it-somewhat inconsistently-in his 
chapter on the misery of hell. But in any event, his own conception seems 
far removed from the New Testament picture of a "furnace of fire" in which 
people will "weep and gnash their teeth" (Matt. 13 :42) and pray for the 
mountains to fall upon them (Rev. 6: 16). It also seems far removed from 
Jesus' understanding of the nature of hell. In the parable of the sheep and 
the goats (Matt. 25 :31-46), for example, Jesus alludes to a form of punishment 
that is neither freely chosen nor expected; and in the parable of the rich man 
and Lazarus (Luke 16:16-31), the rich man wants to warn his five brothers 
"lest they also come into this place of torment" (16:28). As depicted in the 
New Testament, in other words, hell is not the kind of place that even the 
wicked would freely choose to inhabit forever. For it really is a place of 
unbearable suffering and torment. 
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We can appreciate, of course, why Walls might want to water down the 
New Testament picture of hell as a place of unbearable suffering; an eternity 
of such suffering would be, after all, utterly pointless, and a god who would 
actually inflict such suffering would be unspeakably barbaric. It seems to 
me, however, that a universalist such as John Hick, who regards hell as a 
continuation of the purgatorial sufferings of this life, is in the end more 
faithful to the New Testament picture than Walls is. For a universalist can 
regard hell as a genuine form of punishment or correction, rather than a freely 
embraced condition; hence, a universalist has no need to water down the New 
Testament image of unbearable suffering. Perhaps a period of such suffering 
is just what a Hitler or a Goebbels needs; and for that matter, perhaps it is 
just what they endured during the final days of their earthly life. But though 
the New Testament picture clearly includes unbearable suffering, it arguably 
does not include unending suffering at all. For in the New Testament, the 
Greek adjective, "~\ W V \ 0 <;," which our English Bibles translate as "eternal" 
or "everlasting," ~robably signifies divine causality rather than unending 
temporal duration. 
Be all of that as it may, Walls' own conception is that hell is a freely 
embraced condition and one which, for all we know, some may continue to 
embrace forever. Essential to such a conception is this idea: God neither 
keeps the damned in hell against their will nor undermines completely their 
freedom to want to stay there. Walls thus rejects my own view that in the 
universe as God has actually created it no illusion can endure forever. He 
writes: 
Now I am inclined to agree with Talbott that universalism follows if we grant 
his claim that no illusion can endure forever. But if he is correct in his 
account of why this is so, then it is apparent that God forces some persons 
to give up their sinful illusions. For if God causes those persons who con-
tinue to rebel against him to grow ever more miserable and tormented, then 
it seems that God is imposing on those persons the clear knowledge that he 
is the source of happiness, and sin the cause of misery .... So in the end, 
the knowledge which makes impossible the choice of damnation is not ac-
quired through free choice, but is itself impossible to avoid (p. 132). 
Against the idea that God must finally achieve a complete victory over sin, 
Walls thus reasons as follows: For the sake of sustaining human freedom 
throughout eternity, God severely limits the misery of hell and makes sure 
that he never provides the damned with too clear a revelation of himself. 
At this point, however, I begin to suspect a problem of incoherence. I have 
no objection to Wall's claim that, on my view, "God forces some persons to 
give up their sinful illusions," for that is an accurate description of my view. 
As I see it, God does this all the time. A man who, upon entering into an 
adulterous affair, makes a total mess of his life may in time learn a hard 
lesson, one that he in no way chose to learn; and having learned his lesson, 
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he may be utlerly unwilling to repeat the experiment. And similarly for St. 
Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus: As I read the account in Acts, 
Paul in no way chose to have his illusions shattered; and neither did he choose 
to receive a revelation that would in a very brief time transform this "chief 
of sinners" into a Christian missionary. But here I would ask: Are not 
ignorance, deception, and illusion-which God sometimes does remove 
against our will-also obstacles to free choice of the relevant kind? If I am 
ignorant of, or deceived about, the true consequences of my choices, then I 
am in no position to embrace those consequences freely; and similarly, if I 
suffer from an illusion that conceals from me the true nature of God, or the 
true import of union with God, then I am again in no position to reject God 
freely. I may reject a caricature of God, or a false conception, but I would 
be in no position to reject the true God himself. Nor does it help to say, as 
Walls does, that the illusions of the damned are "self-inflicted" (p. 129). For 
insofar as we can make sense of self-deception at all, it seems to be a pro-
tective device that itself arises only in contexts of ambiguity, ignorance, and 
confusion; and besides, a self-inflicted deception is no less an obstacle to free 
choice than a self-inflicted addiction to alcohol or cocaine. When God shat-
ters our illusions and forces us to see the truth, therefore, he precisely re-
moves an obstacle to the very freedom Walls claims we have: the freedom to 
reject not merely a faulty conception of God, but the true God himself. 
But in fact there can be no freedom to reject God forever; the very idea of 
such a freedom is incoherent. And the irony is that the above quotation, 
though intended as a criticism, merely repeats part of my own argument for 
this very conclusion. If God should shatter all of my illusions, correct all of 
my misconceptions, and provide me with a clear vision of what union with 
him entails, he would thereby remove every conceivable motive I might have 
to reject him and also provide me with the strongest conceivable motive to 
unite with him. In the face of such a clear vision, I would be incapable, Walls 
concedes, of rejecting God freely. But that is only half the argument; the 
other half, which Walls ignores, is the argument of the previous paragraph. 
Accordingly, we might put the full argument in the form of a dilemma. Either 
I am fully informed concerning who God is and the consequences of rejecting 
him, or I am not. If I am not fully informed, then (as we saw in the previous 
paragraph) I am in no position to reject the true God at all; and if I am fully 
informed, then (as Walls himself concedes) I am incapable of rejecting God 
freely. So in neither case am I free to reject the true God. And neither, 
according to Paul, do any of us choose our own destiny, which "depends not 
upon man's will or exertion, but upon God's mercy" (Rom. 9:16). The im-
portance of freedom, I would therefore suggest, lies elsewhere, namely in 
this: Free choice-not choosing rightly as opposed to wrongly, but the reality 
of free choice itself-is an essential part of the process whereby God reveals 
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his true nature to us and teaches us the (occasionally hard) lessons we need 
to learn as we travel the road to redemption. 
For these reasons (and others), I find Wall's conception of hell uncom-
pelling. But I am pleased to recommend his book nonetheless. For it is a 
thoughtful discussion of a difficult topic, a valuable review of some important 
arguments, and a genuine source of insight. 
NOTES 
1. I have set forth my reasons for believing this in "Punishment, Forgiveness, and Divine 
Justice," Religious Studies. vol. 29 (June, 1993), pp. 151-68. 
2. I defend this claim in an unpublished paper, "Three Pictures of God in Westem 
Theology," Faith and Philosophy. Vol. 12 (1995), pp. 77-94. 
Speaking of A Personal God: An Essay in Philosophical Theology, by Vincent 
Brummer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. ix and 160. 
$44.95 (Cloth), $14.95 (Paper). 
JOHN GRECO, Fordham University 
The main thesis of Vincent Brummer's book is that philosophical theology 
has an essential contribution to make to the theological quest of faith seeking 
understanding. In the first two chapters of the book Brummer clarifies this 
thesis and defends it against the objection that philosophical methodology is 
inappropriate for the subject matter of theology. In the remaining chapters 
Brummer attempts to illustrate the merits of philosophical theology via an 
investigation of the conceptually thorny claim that human beings can be in 
a personal relationship with God. In these chapters Brummer investigates 
the Reformed doctrine of grace, the ability of God to do evil, the intelligibility 
of double agency, and the possibility of a consoling and morally sensitive 
theodicy. The book ends with an epilogue in which Brummer summarizes 
his conclusions regarding the relationship between philosophy and theology. 
The book is persuasively argued, and almost always a model of clarity. 
Whether one is interested in the methodological or the substantive issues 
treated here, Brummer's book will be found interesting and worthwhile. 
As I have said Brummer treats a wide range of material, but in this review 
I will restrict myself to two main issues. First, I will discuss Brummer's view 
of the nature of philosophical theology and its relation to theological inquiry 
in general, and I will try to resolve what might seem to be an inconsistency 
in Brummer's view of what philosophical theology is. Second, I will briefly 
summarize Brummer's conclusions regarding talk about a personal God, and 
I will argue that Brummer's attempt to provide a morally sensitive theodicy 
fails. 
